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ABSTRACT
An increasing number of professional athletes have decided to cut ties
with sports agents and represent themselves in player contract
negotiations. In the setting of a professional sports league, with a
unionized workforce that operates under standard player contracts,
what sports agents can offer in contract negotiations is necessarily
limited. The player unions themselves recognize this by limiting what
sports agents may earn as a contract advisor. The phenomenon of
players self-negotiating their contracts has legal implications for the
broader sports industry, which this article describes and analyzes,
including: Is a new paradigm emerging in which player contract
negotiations will more frequently involve self-represented players, and
what is feeding it? What complementary services and service
providers willfill the gap as more athletes represent themselves in
player contract negotiations? What should the role of player unions
be in supporting self-represented players in contract negotiations?
What are the obligations of professional leagues, teams, and their
lawyers who find themselves negotiating with self-represented
players? And what, if anything, can sports agents do to adapt to this
new paradigm and reconceive their relationships with professional
athletes ?
I. INTRODUCTION
When Russell Okung, offensive tackle for the Seattle Seahawks,
was in the last year of his contract with the team, he announced that
when his contract expired in 2016 he would "free my agent"-that is,
negotiate his own player contract.' After five years in the National
Football League (NFL), Okung had confidence that he understood the
business and his worth in the market. From his perspective, an agent
no longer added enough value to justify the NFL standard three
percent commission paid to "contract advisors." 2 Where special
expertise might be useful-for example, reviewing the fine print of his
next contract-Okung planned to hire a lawyer at a billing rate not
' Russell Okung, Betting on Myself, THE PLAYER TRIBUNE (July 20, 2015),
http://www.theplayerstribune.com/russell-okung-seahawks-agents-in-sports/ (last
visited May 1, 2016).
2 NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors § 4 (June 2012) [hereinafter
NFLPA Regulations].
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linked to playing salary.
3
Okung was only the latest in a steady stream of professional
athletes who have decided to cut ties with sports agents. 4 In the setting
of a professional sports league, with a unionized workforce that
operates under standard player contracts, services offered by sports
agents in contract negotiations are necessarily limited.5 The player
unions themselves recognize this by limiting what sports agents may
earn as a contract advisor.6 The NFL Players Association (NFLPA)
has gone a step further in supporting players who shed their agents by
supplying information on comparable player contracts, economic
analysis of those contracts, and legal advice on contract language.
7
Similarly, other service providers offer adjunct services to athletes
negotiating on their own behalf but still in need of certain forms of
expertise, including legal, financial, and marketing. 8
Whether or not Okung's declaration is a bellwether for the sports
agent business, these developments have legal implications for the
broader sports industry. This article does not seek to make normative
judgments about the presence of a sports agent in player contract
negotiations, but rather, describes and responds to the phenomenon of
"freeing my agent." Questions raised include: Is a new paradigm
emerging in which player contract negotiations will more frequently
3 See Okung, supra note 1.
4 See William Rothstein, The Business of Sports Representation: Agent
Evolution in the "Industry," 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 39 (2009) (listing
professional athletes who do not use agents, including Alex Rodriguez, LeBron
James, Grant Hill, Ray Allen, Tim Duncan, and Raghib Ismail); see also Jason
Belzer, Do Professional Athletes Need to be Represented by Sports Agents?, FORBES
(July 27, 2015), http://www.forbes.conmsites/jasonbelzer/2015/07/27/do-
professional-athletes-need-to-be-represented-by-sports-agents/#709f39d66aa8 (last
visited May 1, 2016) (Ereck Flowers); Billy Stephens, Do You Really Need an
Agent? Part I, SPORTS MONEY (Aug. 3, 2013), http://sportsmoney.com/do-you-
really-need-an-agent-part-1/ (last visited May 1, 2016) (Matt Elam, Ricky Williams,
Alexander Ovechkin).
5 See, e.g., NLFPA Regulations, supra note 2, at 11-12.
6id.
7 Tom Pelissero, NFL Players Mull Freeing Agents from Future Contract
Negotiations, USA TODAY SPORTS (July 21, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2015/07/21/nflpa-union-contracts-no-
agents-russell-okung-rashad-jennings-eric-winston/30490459/ (last visited May 1,
2016). An emerging resource for athletes in minor and foreign sports leagues are
online sports recruitment networks similar to LinkedIn, where teams can scout for
free agent talent.; See also Nadine Skoczylas, Can a Linkedln for Athletes Ever
Replace Sports Agents?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 24, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-24/can-a-linkedin-for-athletes-
ever-replace-sports-agents (last visited May 1, 2016).
' See Rothstein, supra note 4, at 38-41.
FREE MY AGENT
involve self-represented players? If so, what are the underlying
reasons and practical consequences? What complementary services
and service providers will fill the gap as more athletes represent
themselves in player contract negotiations? What role should player
unions have in supporting self-represented players in contract
negotiations? What are the obligations of professional leagues, teams,
and their lawyers who find themselves negotiating with self-
represented players? Finally, what, if anything, can sports agents do to
adapt to the new paradigm and reconceive their relationships with
professional athletes?
This article lays the groundwork for anticipating and analyzing the
issues and challenges likely to arise as more professional athletes
represent themselves in player contract negotiations. Part II recounts
the trajectory of the sports agent business and reports on the signal
episodes in which professional athletes have cut ties with agents,
focusing on the athletes' motivations and objectives, and the extent to
which such episodes are situational or herald a new paradigm. Part III
describes the still-shifting responses to player self-representation,
including support and resources offered by player associations, and
alternative models of player representation offered by traditional law
firms, financial advisors and institutions, and marketing and media
relations firms. Part IV addresses potential ethical concerns for
lawyers representing teams and leagues in negotiations with self-
represented athletes, and how to comply with professional conduct
rules in that setting. Part V revisits the role of traditional sports agents
and how they might reconfigure their service model to remain
competitive in the changing environment and create value for players.
In sum, this article aspires to be a resource for athletes, agents, and the
constellation of other professionals who interact with them as the
player-representation service model evolves.
II. PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES OPTING FOR SELF-REPRESENTATION
The sports agent business is at a crossroads as more athletes opt to
represent themselves in player contract negotiations or uncouple agent
fees from player salary. 9 To understand why this is happening, it is
9 Nick Bove, Athletes without Agents, WEE1 93.7 BLOG NETWORK (June 2,
2010), http://mashup.weei.consports/2010/06/02/leeinks-list-athletes-without-
agents (last visited May 1, 2016); Nick Powell, Giants' Union Rep Rashad Jennings
Pushing for Players to Negotiate Their Own Contracts, NJ ADVANCE MEDIA (July
23, 2015), http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2015/07/giants-union rep-rashad_
jennings-approves-of playe.htnl (last visited May 1, 2016); Jesse Reed, Examining
Pitfalls of Negotiating NFL Contracts without an Agent, SPORTSNAUT (July 2015),
http://sportsnaut.conVm2015/07/examining-pitfalls-of-negotiating-nfl-contracts-
continued...
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first necessary to briefly recount the trajectory of the sports agent
business and developments in the world of professional sports that
have had a deep impact on sports agents. This Part also describes the
typical career path of the professional athlete in economic terms. This
discussion sets the stage for scrutinizing recent episodes in which
players have shed their agents, to identify the environmental factors
and motivations that led them to self-representation.
A. The Evolution of the Sports Agent Business
For most of the history of professional sports, from the founding of
the first professional baseball league in 1876 through the 1960s, the
vast majority of athletes represented themselves in negotiating their
player contracts. 10 This was largely the byproduct of the industry
norm that a club "owned" a player it had introduced to the major
leagues and controlled his career from that point forward. Thus,
using a negotiating agent would not have improved the player's lot in
any meaningful way, creating little incentive to retain and pay such an
agent. 12 Indeed, many teams refused to deal directly with sports
agents in salary negotiations. 
13
By the 1970s, four dramatic developments in professional
sports gave agents a foothold.1 4 First, free agency allowed veteran
players to sell their services on the open market.1 5 Second, upstart
leagues in football, hockey, and basketball created competition for
player services, driving up salaries. 16 Both of these first two
developments led players to seek assistance in navigating among
competing offers for their services.1 7 Third, player unions came into
their own, extracting significant concessions from ownership, while
without-an-agent/ (last visited May 1, 2016).
10 See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS
AGENTS 11 (2d ed. 2008) (this book focuses its discussion on the four major U.S.
sports leagues: Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association, National
Football League, and National Hockey League).
11 PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS
693 (5th ed. 2015).
12 Donald Fehr, Union Views Concerning Agents: With Commentary on the
Present Situation in Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 71, 72 (1993).
13 Id. (noting the clubs' position towards players: "You are my potential
employee, or you are my actual employee, and if you want to talk to me about a new
contract or a raise, I will be glad to talk to you, by yourself, on my terms, for as long
as I want to, and you cannot bring anyone with you.").
14 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 12-14.
15 Id.
161d.
17 Id.
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formally delegating the role of salary negotiator to sports agents.18
Fourth, television revenues and endorsement deals were booming,
placing even more money on the table for players. 19 At this juncture,
players needed negotiating and financial planning expertise to exploit
opportunity and optimize their wealth. The consensus view, especially
for amateur athletes coming out of high school and college, was that
agent representation in negotiating the first professional player
contract was essential "to protect their [player] interests and match the
negotiating skill of a general manager or member of a professional
team."20
At the same time, rising player salaries and the commissions to be
earned from negotiating those salaries made the career of sports agents
more appealing. 21 By the early 2000s, the aggregate number of sports
agents registered in the four major sports leagues-MLB, NBA, NFL,
and NHL-amounted to almost one agent for every two players on
their combined rosters. 22 Individuals from a variety of educational
backgrounds-dominated by law, finance, and business-came to
populate the sports agent field.23 While negotiating the player contract
18 Id. See also James Malone & Daren Lipinsky, The Game Behind the Games:
Unscrupulous Agents in College Athletics & California's Miller-Ayala Act, 17 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 413, 433 (1997) ("A part of the problem is that there's just a terrible
psychology on the part of many athletes, not all but many athletes, who are used to
being given things. All of their lives they have been pampered and promoted on the
basis of their tremendous athletic prowess.").
19 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 12-14.
20 Stacey M. Nahrwold, Are Professional Athletes Better Served by A Lawyer-
Representative Than an Agent? Ask Grant Hill, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 431, 437
(1999); see also L.A. Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717, 719 (S.D.
Cal. 1960) (allowing college football player to breach contract with NFL team based
in part on his lack of representation); see generally Curtis D. Rypma, Sports Agents
Representing Athletes: The Need for Comprehensive State Legislation, 24 VAL. U. L.
REV. 481, 482 (1990).
21 Stephens, supra note 4 (observing that sports agents are typically paid 3-10%
of the player's salary).
22 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 18. (counting approximately 1,800 sports
agents as of 2006, when the combined rosters of the four major leagues totaled
approximately 4,200 players).
23 The earliest sports agents often lucked into the role. See, e.g., LEIGH
STEINBERG, THE AGENT: MY 40-YEAR CAREER MAKING DEALS AND CHANGING THE
GAME 35-38 (Thomas Donne Books 2014) (law student Steinberg was the resident
advisor in NFL quarterback Steve Bartkowski's college dorm); Scott R. Rosner,
Conflicts of Interest and the Shifting Paradigm of Athlete Representation, 11 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 193, 196 n.9 (2004) (Donald Dell was friends with Arthur Ashe when
he needed help negotiating endorsement deals after he won Wimbledon); BOB
WOOLF, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 42-46 (New York: Atheneum 1976) (Woolf
counseled Boston Red Sox pitcher Earl Wilson about a car accident before
negotiating his player contract). See also Andrew Brandt, So You Want to be an
continued...
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remained an agent's core service, many agents began to handle
endorsement deals as well as a menu of management services relating
to tax and estate planning, investing, budgeting, intellectual property
protection, real estate, charitable giving, and domestic arrangements.
24
Agents eager to recruit and retain elite athletes also began providing
what have been derided as "babysitting" services, which can range
from retrieving items left in the team hotel during a road trip to
helping conceal adultery from a spouse.
25
As the sports agent business became increasingly competitive,
ethics became the "biggest casualty." 26 Client poaching and illegal
recruiting tactics became rampant. 27 Sports agent malfeasance
frequently made the headlines and court dockets, with stories of agents
defrauding clients, misappropriating client funds, sabotaging college
athlete eligibility and prospects, engaging in conflicts of interest, and
providing incompetent representation. 28 Commentators even
suggested that "because of the fears associated with agents, some
athletes are again meeting with management one-on-one in order to
get the best possible deal."29 Thus, despite the agent's purported role
NFL Agent, HUFFINGTON POST SPORTS (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-brandt/so-you-want-to-be-an-
nfl b 764188.html (last visited May 15, 2016) (noting the best way to become an
agent is "be college roommates with a first-round draft pick").
24 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 31-32.
25 See also Malone & Lipinsky, supra note 18, at 433.
26 See Ethan Lock, The Regulatory Scheme for Player Representatives in the
National Football League: The Real Power of Jerry Maguire, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 319,
320 (1998); see also Mike Freeman, Pro Football: Protecting Players From Their
Agents; Misconduct Leaves NFL Union Fearful of Incompetence and Greed, N.Y.
TIMES (Jul. 26, 1998), http://www.nytimes.conV1998/07/26/sports/pro-football-
protecting-players -their-agents-misconduct-leaves -nfl-union-
fearful.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Jun. 20, 2016).
27 See Stacey B. Evans, Sports Agents: Ethical Representatives or Overly
Aggressive Adversaries?, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 91, 102-03, 107-08 (2010);
Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and State
Efforts Do Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National Licensing
System May Cure the Problem, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1225, 1227-28 (2004).
28 See Jones v. Childers, 18 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 1994); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.
Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Fla. 2000); Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984); People v.
Sorkin, 64 A.D.2d 680, (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Josh Luch, Confessions of an Agent,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.si.com/more-
sports/2010/10/12/agent (last visited June 20, 2016);
29 See Evans, supra note 27, at 127; David S. Caudill, Sports and Entertainment
Agents and Agent-Attorneys: Discourses and Conventions Concerning Crossing
Jurisdictional and Professional Borders, 43 AKRON L. REV. 697, 713 (2010)
(observing that "[t]he problem we have now is how to protect the player from the
agent").
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as protector of athletes' interests in relation to team owners, the need
arose to protect athletes' interests in relation to agents, 30 resulting in
extensive regulation of agents by Congress, state legislatures, and
players associations. 31
Agent regulation was a response to multiple impulses and
concerns, most prominently the need to reinforce the fiduciary duties
that are central to the principal/agent relationship. 32 As described in
the sports agent context, the essence of this role is "undivided loyalty
[to the player] and the duty to act in good faith at all times." 33 The
Restatement of Agency apportions a fiduciary's duties into two
distinct buckets. 34 The "duty of loyalty" primarily requires an agent to
avoid conflicts of interest and self-dealing, preserve confidentiality,
and follow the principal's instructions. 35 The agent's "duty of
performance" requires care, competence, and diligence, as well as
acting only within the scope of actual authority granted by the
principal, complying with the law, accounting for all of the principal's
funds, and keeping the principal apprised of all matters that may affect
his interests. 36 Proliferating public and private regulation of sports
agents has attempted to "explicitly spell out these obligations." 37
The costs imposed by both the regulatory environment and player
demand for a "smorgasbord of services" led to consolidation in the
agency business as smaller firms and independent agents lacked the
resources to lure and keep clients. 38 However, "the synergies sought
by consolidation [led] to an increased likelihood of yet another ethical
dilemma-conflicts of interest." 39 The big agencies typically
represent multiple players in the same league and even multiple
31 See Caudill, supra note 29, at 713.
31 See, e.g., Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801- 07
(effective 2004) [hereinafter SPARTA]; Uniform Athlete Agent Act (adopted by 42
states as of 2014) [hereinafter UAAA]; NFLPA Regulations, supra note 2.
32 See Richard T. Karcher, Solving Problems in the Player Representation
Business: Unions Should Be the "Exclusive" Representatives of the Players, 42
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 737, 748 (2006).
33 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 20.
34 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01-8.12 (2006).
35 Id. at 88 8.02-8.06 (2006).
36 1d. at 88 8.07-8.12 (2006); see ROBERT H. RuxiN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO
AGENTS 13 (5th ed. 2010) (contextualizing the agent's duties in the world of athlete
representation).
37 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 21; see, e.g., SPARTA, supra note 31, at §
7802; UAAA, supra note 30, at § 14; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-1 (McKinney
2003); NFLPA Regulations, supra note 2, at § 3(B).
31 See Karcher, supra note 32, at 740-41; see Rosner, supra note 23, at 197.
39 See Rosner, supra note 23, at 195; see also Karcher, supra note 32, at 759.
2016]
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players on the same team. 40 Some agencies represent team
management, alongside players and coaches.4 1 Players understandably
become disenchanted with their agents when a conflict rears its head.
Former San Francisco 49ers quarterback Alex Smith considered
changing his agent during the period when he was looking for a new
team because his agent also represented another free agent
quarterback, rival Peyton Manning.
42
Ethical shortcomings in the sports agent business have not been
alleviated by the presence of lawyers ostensibly bound by rules of
professional conduct. To the contrary, a "competitive tension"
between non-attorney agents and attorney agents has emerged, with
attorneys at a disadvantage insofar as they are restrained by rules
barring, for example, solicitation, conflicts of interest, and
unauthorized practice of law (UPL) in states where they are not
licensed. 43 Implicit in this tension is that non-attorney agents
themselves are engaging in UPL, and doing so in an ethically
questionable manner. 44 However, few jurisdictions actively enforce
their UPL restrictions, and have little incentive to do so against sports
agents increasingly subject to parallel-if similarly rarely enforced-
ethical regulations. 45 Thus, regulatory failure has allowed non-
attorney agents to exploit their "operational" freedom vis-h-vis
attorney agents to dominate the business as well as degrade its
reputation.
46
Coinciding with increasing concern about agent ethics has been the
increasing complexity of major league collective bargaining
40 See Rosner, supra note 23, at 210-11.
41 Id. at 214.
42 Ryan Wilson, Report: Alex Smith Could Drop Agent Who Also Represents
Payton Manning, CBSSPORTS.COM (Mar. 18, 2012),
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/1 7883556/report-alex-smith-could-
drop-agent-who-also-represents-peyton-manning (last visited May 1, 2016); see also
Darren Heitner, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Rookie NFL Players,
SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Nov. 20, 2013), http://sportsagentblog.com/2013/11/20/
conflicts-of-interest-in-the-representation-of-rookie-nfl-players/ (last visited May 1,
2016); Jack Marshall, The Unforgivable Conflict of Interest: Sports Agents, Robbing
their Ignorant Clients, ETHICS ALARMS (Jan. 16, 2014),
https://ethicsalarms.com/2014/01/16/the-unforgivable-conflict-of-interest-sports-
agents-robbing-their-ignorant-clients/ (last visited May 1, 2016) (identifying
conflicts in Scott Boras' representation of MLB pitchers Clayton Kershaw and
Masahiro Tanaka).
41 See Caudill, supra note 29, at 701.
44 See id at 704.
45 See id at 711-13 (describing how real estate agents have been subject to
effective UPL prohibitions that, e.g., specifically identify documents that must be
prepared by lawyers).
46 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 106.
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agreements (CBAs) over the last 20 years. Collectively, major league
CBAs have spawned a push-and-pull effect on the utility of sports
agents. 47 Their greater complexity recommends enlisting sports agents
for their sophisticated and practiced understanding of CBA economics,
while tailoring the player contract to the client's particular needs.
48
These same CBAs, however, have dictated a wide range of non-
negotiable player benefits and have standardized many aspects of the
player-team relationship. 49 All four major professional leagues now
require use of a standard player contract in which the only negotiable
terms relate to compensation and length. 50 Further, CBAs have
introduced elaborate revenue sharing systems involving rookie pay
scales and salary caps/taxes that guarantee players a minimum share of
aggregate league revenues while giving owners a measure of cost
control and predictability. 51 With the bargaining range for player
compensation circumscribed by the CBA and standard contract
language, the agent's role as contract advisor arguably has narrowed.52
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the shrinking role of the
sports agent in negotiating the player contract is that the leading
textbook in the field, Peter Carfagna's Representing the Professional
Athlete, barely discusses that setting. 53 The book's negotiation and
drafting exercises involve the athlete/agent representation agreement,
athlete endorsements, publicity rights licensing, and the legal
relationship between the agent and the mega-agency. 54 Discussion of
relevant law extends to agent regulation, NCAA amateurism rules,
41 See generally Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry:
Intended and Unintended Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 781, 782 (2006).
4' Dan Weil, NBA Do-It-Yourselfers Rare, SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL (Jan. 31,
2000), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2000/01/20000131/No-
Topic-Name/NBA-Do-It-Yourselfers-
Rare.aspx?hl=Los%20Angeles%20Clippers&sc=0. (last visited May 1, 2016).
41 See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2011-2020, Arts. 7, 8
[hereinafter, NFL CBA] (outlining compensation parameters for rookies and
veterans with less than three seasons); MLB Basic Agreement 2012-2016, Art. VI
[hereinafter, MLB BA] (outlining salary calculations).
5" See Shepard Goldfein, James A. Keyte, & Paul M. Eckles, Player-Team
Contractual Relations Generally, 11 Bus. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 125:7 (3d ed.
2016); see also, NFL CBA, supra note 49, App. A; MLB BA, supra note 50, Sched.
A; NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement 2011-12, Ex. A; NHL Collective
Bargaining Agreement 2012-2022, Ex. 1 [hereinafter NHL CBA].
51 See generally Davis, supra note 47.
52 See Rosner, supra note 23, at 244 (Some would argue that the complexity of
the salary cap era makes professional contract advice even more essential); see also
Weil, supra note 48.
51 See generally PETER CARFAGNA, REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE
(2d ed. 2014).
54 Id. at xi-xvii.
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commercial contract drafting principles, intellectual property, tort, and
statutory compensation for injury, and employment law.55 Notably
absent is any in-depth treatment of labor law or the major league CBA
provisions relevant to negotiating the player contract. Other than
describing the numerous instances in which agents have abused the
trust of their clients, 56 the textbook mentions the agent's role with
respect to the player-team contract only briefly in the context of
recommending the athlete's absence from the negotiating table. 57 By
no means does this appraisal impugn the merits of Professor
Carfagna's work; it very much deserves its reputation as "the most
authoritative sports agent book."5 8 But its coverage choices reflect
that the sports agent business has developed in new directions that
deemphasize the function that was its provenance: negotiating the
player contract.
B. The Professional Athlete's Career Path
In the environment described above, professional athletes have
begun to question whether agents qua contract advisors deliver enough
value in the contract negotiation setting to justify paying the
commissions they charge. 59 To put this trending skepticism in
perspective, consider the earning history of a journeyman NBA player
under the league's current CBA. As an amateur coming out of college,
he participates in the NBA draft, which has two rounds. Players
drafted in the first round sign a guaranteed two-year contract that is
subject to a rookie salary cap with limited room for negotiation. 60 The
team that drafts the first round player has rights to him for up to four
years, at which time he may become a restricted free agent. Only after
five years may he become eligible for unrestricted free agency. 61 By
contrast, players drafted in the second round may obtain unrestricted
free agency status earlier, but only after playing under a non-
guaranteed contract, often for the league minimum. 62 Undrafted
players become unrestricted free agents, although rarely do they ever
55 Id. at 10-15, 31-61, 83-90, 108-12, 120-42, 174-92, 197-207.
56 Id. at 2-10.
57 Id. at 80-81; infra note 202.
51 See Darren Heitner, Announcing Second Edition of Most Authoritative Sports
Agent Book, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Oct. 29, 2014),
http://sportsagentblog.com/2013/10/29/announcing-second-edition-of-most-
authoritative-sports-agent-book/ (last visited May 15, 2016).
59 Rothstein, supra note 4.
6' NBA CBA, supra note 49, Art. VIII.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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play in the NBA.6 3 Thus for the first four years of most players'
careers, their earning potential is fairly predictable. Keep in mind that
the average NBA career length is 4.8 years.
64
NBA players who eventually become unrestricted free agents enter
a phase of their career in which the market for their services is at its
most competitive, with their negotiating leverage deriving mostly from
their own demonstrated basketball skills. 65 Thus, marquee players
often will "max out" the system, obtaining the longest and most
remunerative contract allowed under the CBA and not requiring much
negotiation. 66 Even if our journeyman player strikes it rich as an
unrestricted free agent, his contract is subject to collectively-bargained
parameters under the salary cap. 67 Throughout this process, the player
union collects and archives information about every player contract.
68
Furthermore, with the advent of the Internet and proliferation of sports
publications, players and the public have almost instantaneous access
to reams of data about player compensation and contract structures.
69
As NBA agent Keith Kreiter stated, "Every contract is just a form
agreement. My plummer [sic] could negotiate a first-round pick's
contract as good as the best negotiator in the country can. ,70
The economic path of players in the other major sports is similarly
ascertainable. Thus, players across all sports are having second
thoughts about agent commissions that range from three to ten percent
of a player's gross, pre-tax compensation. 71 For example, in 2015, the
63 See generally Michael A. McCann, ft's Not About the Money: The Role of
Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1488 (2006).
64 Cork Gaines, The Average NBA Player Will Make a lot More in His Career
than the Other Major Sports, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-the-average-nba-player-will-make-lot-more-
in-his-career-than-the-other-major-sports-2013-10 (last visited May 15, 2016).
65 See Evans, supra note 27, at 105-06.
66 NBA CBA, supra note 49, Art. II.
67 See McCann, supra note 63, at 1488-89 n. 162.
68 See NBPA website, http://nbpa.com/about/ (last visited May 15, 2016) (noting
that players can request from the union "salary and pertinent information to assist in
individual contract negotiations").
69 See KARCHER, supra note 32, at 765; see also Darren Heitner, Are We Really
Needed?, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (March 24, 2009),
http://sportsagentblog.com/2009/03/24/are-we-really-needed/ (last visited May 15,
2016) (observing that travel agents, stockbrokers, and other go-between professions
have withered in the Internet age).
70 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 28.
7' Billy Stephens, Do You Really Need an Agent? Part II, SPORTS MONEY (Aug.
15, 2013), http://sportsmoney.com/do-you-really-need-an-agent-part-2/ (last visited
May 1, 2016) (noting that the NFL caps agent commission at 3% and the NBA at
4%).
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average MLB player salary topped $4,000,000 per year, while the
average MLB contract advisor earned five percent commission.7 2
Doing the math, the agent would skim $200,000 off the top of that
annual salary, and $1,000,000 over the course of a five-year deal.
With player compensation growing every year, and the agent's utility
as a contract adviser shrinking, paying a commission-as opposed to a
flat fee or hourly rate-makes less sense to certain players.7 3 The "big
bucks" that led to widespread use of contract advisors in the last
decades of the Twentieth century have gotten so big in the first
decades of the Twenty-First century that some players are second-
guessing the traditional agent relationship and mode of
compensation. 4
C. Players Negotiating Their Own Player Contracts
Self-negotiation of player contracts in the modem era actually
dates back to the 1980s and Danny Ainge of the Boston Celtics, Alan
Trammel of the Detroit Tigers, and Mike Singletary of the Chicago
Bears. Interestingly, the motivation for going it alone was not
always to maximize take-home pay.76 Alan Trammel acknowledged
that he left money on the table in his 1980 self-negotiation with the
Tigers, but wanted to stay loyal to a team that brought him up through
the minor leagues and stuck it out through his injuries. 77 When Danny
Ainge re-signed with the Celtics in 1986 without representation, he
agreed to a six-year, $4.1 million deal, saving $160,000 in
commissions.78 But the last three years of that contract paid him
significantly below the league average, a fact he rationalizes as a
72 Kurt Baudenhausen, Average MLB Player Salary Nearly Double NFL 's, But
Still Trails NBA 's, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.forbes.con/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2015/01/23/average-mlb-salary-
nearly-double-nfls-but-trails-nba-players/#775daa0e269e (last visited May 1, 2016);
Stephens, supra note 71.
71 See Stephens, supra note 71.
71 See Rothstein, supra note 4, at 38-40; Karcher, supra note 32, at 744.
75 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 24.
76 Id.
77 See Mitchell Kramer, Alan Trammell Negotiated His Own Contract, PRO
SPORTS GROUP, https://prosportsgroup.com/sports-agent-news/mitch-flashback-alan-
trammell-negotiated-his-own-contract (last visited May 1, 2016). (But Trammell
conceded he might use a contract advisor when he became a free agent later in his
career); See UPI Archives, Shortstop Alan Trammell Is Hinting He May Become A
Free Agent (Jan. 19, 1989), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/01/19/Shortstop-
Alan-Trammell-is-hinting-he-may-become-a/5527601189200/ (last visited May 1,
2016).
78 See Bove, supra note 9.
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learning experience that led him to post-playing career success as an
NBA general manager.79
In the late 1990s, coinciding with the rise in player salaries and
stricter CBA parameters for those salaries, a handful of players chose
to represent themselves in large part to avoid paying an agent's fee on
a commission basis.80  This first wave of athletes to self-negotiate
were mostly veteran free agents who had a fairly predictable market
value. Tight end Tony McGee negotiated a 1999 contract extension
with the Cincinnati Bengals that put him at the top of the yearly
average salaries of three comparable players.81 He observed: "[I]t was
a good fit to stay here. I also felt like [team ownership] treated me
very fairly. . . . Maybe an agent would have gotten me a couple of
thousand more. Maybe not. But I don't have any agent fees to pay." 82
In general, veteran free agents who were inclined to stay put, and
trusted their team, were more confident in self-negotiating. 3  This
theme especially reverberated when the free agent was recovering
from injuries or winding down his career, including, in 2002 alone,
New England Patriots linebacker Tedy Bruschi, St. Louis Cardinals
pitcher Matt Morris, and Seattle Mariners pitcher Jamie Moyer. 84
Trust in management and a desire for stability at the tail end of his
career motivated running back Ricky Williams to self-negotiate his
2008 contract extension with the Miami Dolphins.8 5 Similarly, when
'9 See id. (also noting that Hakeem Olajuwon negotiated his own contract in
1986 with the help of an attorney).
8o See Karcher, supra note 32, at 743-44.
81 Geoff Hobson, McGee Negotiates Own Contract Extension, THE CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER (Dec. 15 1999), http://bengals.enquirer.con1999/12/15/ben-mcgee-
negotiates own.html (last visited May 1, 2016).
82 Id.
83 See RuxIN, supra note 36, at 24 (noting that in 2009 most of the 15 NFL
players-out of 1950-who negotiated their own contracts were veterans who had
used an agent for a prior negotiation); see also McCann, supra note 63, at 1497-99
(noting the phenomenon of "regional affinity" or "hometown bias" whereby athletes
forgo more money in favor of remaining in place).
84 See Rosner, supra note 23, at 197 n.12; Jim Salisbury, Era of the Sports Agent
is Here to Stay, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Dec. 26, 2003),
http://articles.philly.con2003-12-26/sports/25470506_ 1agents-jeff-borris-seattle-
general-manager (last visited May 1, 2016).
85 Jason Cole, Source: Williams Should Have Gotten Better Deal, YAHOO
SPORTS (Sep. 5, 2008), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=jc-
williamscontract090508 (last visited May 1, 2016). This news report, and many
others at the time, crowed about the weak deal Williams negotiated for himself, a
familiar refrain in commentary about player self-negotiators. It is not within the
scope of this article to assess the efficacy of player self-negotiators or whether an
agent would have struck a better deal, but it is worth observing that what constitutes
a good deal is highly subjective in this setting. See McCann, supra note 63, at 1460
continued...
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safety Bernard Pollard self-negotiated his 2014 contract extension with
the Tennessee Titans, it was noted that he was at the end of his career
and did not want to leave the team.
8 6
Some veterans who have negotiated their own contracts have
explained below-market deals as a calculated accommodation of team
finances to enable building a winning team. When Gilbert Arenas re-
signed with the Washington Wizards in 2008 without using an agent,
he acknowledged accepting an offer $16 million less than the
maximum he would have been entitled to under the CBA's free agent
caps. 8' He explained his decision as reluctance to "financially bind"
his team: "I don't wanna [sic] be one of those players and three years
down the road your team is strapped and can't do anything about it.
" 88
In 2013, San Francisco 49er defensive lineman Justin Smith self-
negotiated the two-year contract extension that was anticipated to be
his last after returning from an injury.8 9 Although the new deal cut his
overall compensation in half, Smith at the time described it as "pretty
simple, straightforward" because it "wasn't about [my agent]" but
"about wanting to be here, wanting to play and having an opportunity
to be on a great team and go for the championship."
90
Self-negotiation also made sense to Ray Allen, an elite basketball
player who wanted to stay with his team under a CBA that capped
compensation for players in his situation. As a free agent in 1999,
Allen negotiated the richest deal in Milwaukee Bucks history and the
maximum salary permitted by the CBA at the time-$70 million over
six years-saving himself more than $2.8 million in the traditional
four percent agent's commission. 91 Even so, Allen realized he needed
(observing that "many [athletes] significantly discount financial compensation.
Indeed, for a variety of expressed motivations, professional athletes regularly select
the non-optimal contract offer, at least in the traditional sense of optimality").
86 Frank Schwab, Would Ndamukong Suh Really Negotiate His Own Contract
with the Lions?, YAHOO SPORTS (March 4, 2014), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-
shutdown-corner/would-ndamukong-suh-really-negotiate-his-own-contract-with-the-
lions--174504706.html (last visited May 15, 2016).
17 See Associated Press, Reports: Arenas Agrees to Six-Year, $111M Contract to
Help Wizards' Future, ESPN (July 7, 2008),
http://espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3473164 (last visited May 15, 2016).
88 Id.
89 Cam Inman, San Francisco 49ers Sign Justin Smith to a Two-Year Extension,
THE MERCURY NEWS (June 19, 2013)
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_23498132/san-francisco-49ers-sign-justin-smith-
two-year (last visited May 1, 2016).
9' Id.; see Player Salary Data on Justin Smith, SPOTRAC
http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/san-francisco-49ers/justin-smith/cash-earnings/ (last
visited May 31, 2016).
9' See Michael James, Ray: It's No Secret, Agents in Way, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Feb. 12, 1999), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/sports/ray-no-secret-agents-
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to hire a lawyer for an hourly fee to review the contract, and a business
manager and accountant to make sure the deal was structured
beneficially. 92 He retained an attorney-agent at an hourly fee to
negotiate his next contract-a five-year extension potentially worth
$85 million.93 While Allen advocated that more NBA players should
represent themselves in contract negotiations, he also carved out
important exceptions to that rule, including when a player changes
teams or is on the verge of being cut. 94
Yet, free agents moving on to a new team apparently have also felt
comfortable representing themselves when they have confidence in
their market value. When the Cincinnati Bengals cut Pro Bowl wide
receiver Carl Pickens in 2000, he self-negotiated a five-year deal with
the Tennessee Titans remarking: "This is my third time going through
this situation ... so I kind of know what I want. I don't need an agent
to tell me 'yea or nay' over a contract I can read and understand. 95
Similarly, in 2003, MLB pitcher Curt Schilling and outfielder Gary
Sheffield negotiated their own free-agent deals in which they moved
teams. 96 New England Patriots wide receiver Randy Moss fired his
long-time agent in 2010, determined to negotiate his next player
contract on his own, while retaining a new agent for marketing
opportunities. 97 NFL quarterback Daunte Culpepper famously
negotiated his own contracts throughout his career, although towards
the end, in 2010, retained a lawyer to advise him.98
Occasionally, the narrative about an athlete who represents himself
in a contract negotiation suggests that the athlete defaulted to that role
only because of differences with his agent. Matt Morris negotiated his
article- 1.835148. (last visited May 1, 2016).
92 See id.
93 See RUXIN, supra note 36, at 23.
94 See Weil, supra note 48; see SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 25.
95 Associated Press, Pickens Negotiates Own Contract with Tennessee (July 27,
2000), http://archive.showmenews.com/2000/Jul/20000727Spor013.asp (last visited
May 1, 2016).
96 See Salisbury, supra note 84; see also Rafael Hermoso, Red Sox Ace Out the
Yankees and Get Schilling for 3 years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2003), http://www.
nytimes.com/2003/1 1/29/sports/baseball-red-sox-ace-out-the-yankees-and-get-
schilling-for-3-years.html. (last visited May 1, 2016).
97 Doug Vinci, On to the Next One (Kind of): Randy Moss, SPORTS AGENT BLOG
(July 16, 2010), http://sportsagentblog.com/2010/07/16/on-to-the-next-one-kind-of-
randy-moss/ (last visited May 15, 2016) (listing athletes who have at one point
represented themselves including many already named in this article and Dave Stieb,
Mike Greenwell, David Wells, Tom Seaver, Alan Trammell, Steve Largent, and
Gene Upshaw).
9' Darren Heitner, Even Daunte Culpepper needs help, SPORTSAGENT BLOG
(Feb. 18, 2010), http://sportsagentblog.com/2010/02/18/even-daunte-culpepper-
needs-help/ (last visited May 1, 2016).
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own 2002 contract extension with the St. Louis Cardinals after
dismissing his agent because of doubts about where the "agent's
company was going." 99 Alex Rodriguez removed his agent, Scott
Boras, from negotiations with the New York Yankees in 2007,
commenting that Boras' bidding war strategy was a "huge debacle."
100
In 2012, the NFL's Osi Umenyiora parted ways with his agent just
before he self-negotiated a resolution to contract strife with the New
York Giants, timing that suggests his agent was a "road block" to the
deal.1 01
As alluded to above, trends in athlete self-negotiation often align
with CBA salary structures that fix or circumscribe compensation.
10 2
The NFL's 2011 CBA introduced a new rookie compensation system
that largely predetermined contract value and bonus amounts, thereby
eliminating the vast majority of negotiating required. 1 03 This led many
rookies to extract fee concessions from their agents, and a handful of
rookies to decide to go it alone. 1 04 In 2013, rookie safety Matt Elam, a
Baltimore Ravens first round draft pick, negotiated his player contract
with the advice of his older brother, veteran safety Abram Elam. 105 In
2015, New York Giants offensive tackle Ereck Flowers negotiated his
own deal worth $23 million over four years, saving himself $432,000
99 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 24.
100 See Rothstein, supra note 4, at 20; Evans, supra note 27, at 106-07 (noting
that Gary Sheffield similarly criticized Scott Boras as a "bad person" when he fired
the agent in 2003).
101 Mike Garafolo, Osi Umenyiora, Giants Agree to Restructured Contract,
NJ.COM (June 1, 2012),
http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2012/06/osi-umenyiora-giants-agree to.html.
(last visited May 1, 2016). Conversely, athletes not attuned to their agent's
reputation may even miss opportunities because "certain teams will try to avoid
drafting players who are represented by certain agents." See RUXIN, supra note 36, at
26.
102 See NFL CBA, supra note 49.
103 See NFL CBA, supra note 49, Art. 7.
10 Andrew Brandt, Easy Math for Rookies, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 4,
2015), http://mmqb.si.coni201 5/06/04/nfl-rookie-contracts-cba-agents (last visited
May 1, 2016). (Some believe agents still add value in the new NFL system by
helping prospects train and prep for the draft, getting and navigating media attention,
and negotiating payment technicalities such as offsets, guarantees, bonuses, and
timing). See Jason Fitzgerald, All About Rookie Contracts and the NFL Draft, OVER
THE CAP (Apr. 25, 2016), http://overthecap.com/rookie-contracts-nfl-draft/ (last
visited May 15, 2016).
105 Aaron Wilson, Matt Elam Not Hiring Agent, Plans to Negotiate Own Deal
Before Camp Starts, Source Says, THE BALTIMORE SUN (July 9, 2013),
http://www.baltimoresun.comlsports/ravens/ravens-insider/bal-matt-elam-not-hiring-
an-agent-plans-to-negotiate-own-deal-source-says-20130709-
story.html#ixzz2YZIBZ9P6 (last visited May 1, 2016).
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in agent fees. 106 After the 2016 NFL draft, quarterback Jacoby
Brissett, a New England Patriots third-round pick, announced he
would not hire an agent.107 Similarly, the NBA's slotted salaries for
first-round draft picks, which leave little room for negotiation, spurred
2016 draft prospect Jaylen Brown to forgo an agent, and instead,
consult with the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) on
his first contract. 108
And that brings us to Seattle Seahawks Russell Okung and his
declaration that when he became a free agent in 2016 he would "free
my agent."10 9 In a widely quoted article for The Players' Tribune,
Okung advocated for elite athletes to "take ownership of your career
and your livelihood."' 10 He described an epiphany as a rookie in 2010
when he easily negotiated his agent's commission down from the
standard three percent to 2.5 percent. 1 He started questioning how
one agent could possess all the expertise necessary to advance his
career and the careers of twenty other clients: negotiator, contract law
expert, financial advisor, business and risk manager, marketing
guru.11 2 He realized that at his salary level, the value proposition of
giving away 2.5 percent of everything he earned did not make
sense.11 3 He resolved to educate himself about his market value and to
106 Jordan Raanan, Ereck Flowers, Acting as His Own Agent Signs Rookie
Contract with Giants, NJ.COM (June 18, 2015),
http://www.nj.con/giants/index.ssf/2015/06/ereck-flowers-acting as his own-age
nt signs rookie.html (last visited May 1, 2016).
107 Kevin Duffy, New England Patriots Rookie QB Jacoby Brissett Will
Negotiate First Contract Without An Agent, Per Report, MASSLIVE.COM (May 5,
2016),http://blog.masslive.com/patriots/2016/05/new england-patriots rookie-qb_3
.html. (last visited May 15, 2016).
108 Adrian Wojnarowski & Bobby Marks, How a Top Prospect is Bucking the
System, THE VERTICAL (May 19, 2016), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/how-a-top-
prospect-is-bucking-the-system- 18154261 1.htmi (last visited June 21, 2016) (noting
that Brown eschewed an agent's services despite the fact that many agents don't take
commissions on first deals for high-level players).
109 Okung, supra note 1.
110 Id.; see also Belzer, supra note 4; Powell, supra note 9.
1 Okung, supra note 1.
112 Id. NBA superstar LeBron James had a similar epiphany as a second-year
player when he fired his agent and founded LeBron, Inc. to make deals on his behalf,
including negotiating for equity ownership in companies he endorses. But this
financial model may work only for "players who have tremendous marketing
capabilities." See Rothstein, supra note 4, at 41. Others suggest the personal
management firm works best with the economics of individual sports where some
premier athletes have established their own agencies to represent their interests,
including pro golfer Rory McIlroy and tennis players Roger Federer, Andy Murray,
and Rafael Nadal. See Weiler, supra note 11, at 733.
113 Okung, supra note 1.
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hire a flat-fee lawyer to supply contract expertise. 114 The contract he
ultimately signed with the Denver Broncos in 2016 was richer than
most, and saved him potentially $1.8 million in agent fees.1 1 5
Despite its breadth, the collected history above suggests that the
incidence of professional athlete self-negotiation is still largely
situational and idiosyncratic. 116 The vast majority of the 4,200 players
across the rosters of the four major leagues rely on third-party agents
to negotiate their player contracts. 117 Yet, certain attributes of a
player's situation can make the decision to self-negotiate more likely
and workable. If player compensation numbers are predictable-
either because of CBA parameters or market consensus on player
value-agents risk being sidelined. Similarly, an agent's presence
may be seen as unnecessarily complicating a negotiation between a
team and a player who feels loyalty and trust toward the team and
wants to stay. 118 If not a paradigm shift, trends in athlete self-
negotiation suggest at least a reassessment of the value proposition of
paying a sports agent the standard commissions for negotiating player
contracts. 
1 19
114 id.
115 Bob Condotta, What the National Media Says About Former Seahawk
Russell Okung's New Contract, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 19, 2016),
http://www.seattletimes.com/sports/seahawks/what-the-national-media-says-about-
russell-okungs-contract/ (last visited May 1, 2016) (noting that Okung's contract was
widely criticized for lacking any guaranteed money, which puts an NFL player at
risk of walking away with nothing if he is injured or does not perform); see also
Ryan Clady Discusses Russel Okung's Self-Negotiated Contract, SPORTS AGENT
BLOG (Aug. 1, 2016), http://sportsagentblog.conV2016/08/01/ryan-clady-discusses-
russell-okungs-self-negotiated-
contract/?utm source=feedburner&utm medium=email&utm campaign=Feed%3 A
+IWantToBeASportsAgent+%28SportsAgentBlog.com+-+Sports+Agent+News %29
(last visited Aug. 3, 2016) (reporting that Okung's self-negotiated deal undermined
the negotiating leverage of other players at his position).
116 See generally RUXIN, supra note 36, at 24 (noting that in 2009 only 15 NFL
players out of 1,950 negotiated their own contracts).
... See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 18.
... Brandt, supra note 104.
119 See Evans, supra note 27, at 104; see also Zach Seybert, For Agents,
Business Isn't the Same with Rookie Contracts, SPORTS AGENT BLOG, (May 12,
2016), http://sportsagentblog.conV2016/05/12/business-isnt-the-same-
withrookies/?utm source=feedburner&utm medium=email&utm campaign=Feed%
3A+IWantToBeASportsAgent+%28SportsAgentBlog.com+-
+Sports+Agent+News%29.
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III. SUPPORT AND RESOURCES FOR ATHLETE SELF-
REPRESENTATION
Professional athletes who represent themselves in contract
negotiations nonetheless have recognized that they should not go it
entirely alone. 120 Few players have eschewed all professional
expertise in consummating career-defining contractual relationships.
And a variety of service providers have stepped in to support players
in this situation, including traditional law firms, financial advisors, and
marketing and media relations firms. These entities have sought to
participate in the wealth-creation in professional sports by providing
alternatives to commission-based sports agents and emphasizing the
athlete's, not the agent's, brand.1 21 In addition, player unions have
begun to develop a menu of resources and services to support players
who negotiate their own contracts. 122 This Part will describe the still-
shifting responses by service providers and the unions to trends in
player self-representation.
A. Alternative Service-Providers to Commission-based
Sports Agents
Between going it alone and using a full-service sports agents lie
numerous options. One intermediate measure is using family
members to help negotiate contracts, a route taken by baseball's
George Brett, basketball's Dominque Wilkins, and hockey's Eric
Lindros and Alexander Ovechkin. 123 Ovechkin alone saved easily
$7.5 million by not having to pay an agent the average NHL
commission of six percent of his 10-year $124 million deal.1 24 Miami
tight end Kellen Winslow Jr. used an agent but only after his father,
Hall of Fame tight end Kellen Winslow Sr., auditioned multiple agents
and negotiated down the commission.1 25 Winslow Sr. advised NFL
120 See, e.g., supra notes 87 and 105, and accompanying text.
121 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 34.
122 See infra text accompanying notes 138-143.
123 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 24-25 (Brett was represented by his
brother, Wilkins by his mother, and Lindros by his father); see also RUXIN, supra
note 36, at 24; Michael Farber, Mother Russia: Alex Ovechkin 's Mom Made Sure He
Got What he Deserved, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 25, 2008)
http://www.si.com/nhl/2015/05/08/alex-ovechkins-mother-tatyana-guides-his-career-
sports-illustrated-feature-michael-farber (last visited May 1, 2016) (Ovechkin was
represented by his mother, a former Soviet Union basketball Olympian).
124 See Stephens, supra note 71.
125 See Liz Mullen, Winslow: Show Dad the Money, Sports Business Journal
(Mar. 8, 2004),
http://m.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2004/03/20040308/Labor-
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draft prospects to take their time finding an agent and avoid paying the
maximum commission:
Anyone who is paying 3 percent for contract
negotiation I can tell you is being ripped off....
[A]gents have sold them a bag of goods of what
they can do for them. All an agent can do for
you at the combine is to run around and use
your name so they can recruit other players. 
126
For athlete self-negotiators who seek professional help, most resort
to the hourly-rate lawyer.1 27 Ed Garvey, former executive director of
the NFLPA, emphatically recommended this stratagem in favor of
sports agents who, in his view, overcharge for their services.1 28 Joe
Paterno, former Penn State head coach, similarly advised football
players turning pro to hire an attorney to negotiate "for a fixed price or
at an hourly rate with a percentage cap." 
129
Specialized law practices have cropped up that eschew
commissions and offer advice on player contracts for an hourly fee,
including one managed for a time by Lon Babby who represented
dozens of players in the NBA, WNBA, and MLB.13° One of Babby's
clients was NBA superstar Grant Hill, who paid the firm only
$100,000 in fees to negotiate his first contract, compared to the
Agents/Winslow-Show-Dad-The-Money.aspx. (last visited May 15, 2016).
126 Liz Mullen, Winslow Sr. 's Advice: Don 't Sign Quickly, Don 't Pay 3%
Negotiation Fee, SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL (Jan. 19, 2004),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2004/01/20040119/Labor-
Agents/Winslow-Srs-Advice-Dont-Sign-Quickly-Dont-Pay-3-Negotiation-
Fee.aspx?printandclose=true. (last visited May 15, 2016).
127 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 24 (noting that Tedy Bruschi consulted
with an attorney).
128 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 25 (noting that Minnesota Twins pitcher
Brad Radke used an attorney to negotiate his contract).
129 Joe Paterno, "Put it into Perspective" in FOOTBALL: RISING TO THE
CHALLENGE, THE TRANSITION FROM COLLEGE TO PRO 4 (Geoffrey Scot, ed., 2006).
130 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 25-26 (describing Lon Babby's practice
at Williams & Connolly and clients including NBA players Grant Hill, Tim Duncan,
and Shane Battier; WNBA players Chamique Holdsclaw and Tamika Catchings;
MLB players Melvin Mora, Chris Nelson, and Rickie Weeks). Part of the practice
has since spun off into Tandem Sports & Entertainment. See Scott Soshnick, Jeremy
Lin Agent Tanner Leaves Law Firm to Start Sports Practice, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.con/news/articles/2013-10-14/j eremy-lin-agent-
tanner-leaves-law-firm-to-start-sports-practice (last visited May 15, 2016) (clients
include NBA's Jeremy Lin, Damien Wilkins, and Wesley Saunders, and MLB's
Matt Bowman and Matt McBride).
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standard four percent agent's commission, which would have cost him
$1.8 million.131 Given escalating player salaries, using hourly-rate
attorneys potentially offers huge savings. 132 Even while paying
attorney Johnnie Cochran $500 per hour, Ray Allen's legal fees were a
fraction of the $2.8 million in agent commissions his $70.9 million
salary would have garnered.1 33
Granted, players who prefer hourly-rate attorneys over a full-
service sports agent may be limited to those sufficiently self-reliant to
step out from under the modern agent's umbrella, which can cover
everything from paying monthly bills to driving the moving truck to
finding hotel rooms for visiting family. 134 NBA player Pat Garrity
rebuffed traditional sports agents' "babysitting" in favor of an hourly-
rate attorney because "I didn't want someone always checking up on
me.... I'm a mature person and can take care of a lot of things
myself." 13
5
Professional help from an accountant or economist may also be
sufficient for an athlete to optimize his playing compensation, in the
opinion of Len Elmore, former basketball star and agent.1 36 Similarly,
Alex Rodriguez famously called in friends at investment bank
131 See Nahrwold, supra note 20, at 454. Indeed, attorneys are subject to ethical
limits on charging excessive fees, which may limit their use of commission-based
billing "given the escalating salaries of professional athletes." Jeremy J. Geisel,
Disbarring Jerry Maguire: How Broadly Defining "Unauthorized Practice of Law"
Could Take the "Lawyer" Out of "Lawyer-Agent" Despite the Current State of
Athlete Agent Legislation, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 225, 235 (2007).
132 Kevin Jones, A World Without Agents, AV8 SPORTS RESEARCH CENTER (July
2015), http://www.av8sports.coni/blog/author/kjonesnfl/ (last visited May 15, 2016)
(estimating that if every player used an agent charging between one and 3 percent for
the 2016 season, NFL players will pay agents somewhere between $49.9 and $149.8
million of the league-wide revenues shared with players under the salary cap).
133 See James, supra note 91; see also SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 26-27
(listing the potential advantages to attorney representation including that they are
held to ethical standards including avoidance of conflicts of interest).
134 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 28-31.
135 See id. at 31-32; see also Karcher, supra note 32, at 740 (observing that
sports agencies hire personnel to take care of athlete's needs for a "psychologist,
babysitter, social planner, and counselor"); but see James G. Sammataro, Business
and Brotherhood, Can They Coincide? A Search into Why Black Athletes Do Not
Hire Black Agents, 42 How. L.J. 535, 540 (1999) (describing how many athletes
want and expect their agents "to send [our interns] over to wash his car, or to take his
clothes to the dry cleaners").
136 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 27-28 ("The day has come when
superstars can meet face-to-face with an activist owner and without an agent reach
the basics of an agreement. . . . With professional help from a lawyer, accountant or
even an economist, a superstar might agree with an owner to only 80 or 90 percent of
what an agent could have gotten him, and wind up in no worse position than if an
agent did the deal.").
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Goldman Sachs to mediate his 2007 near-split with the Yankees,
resulting in a 10-year contract potentially worth $275 million. 137
College athletes contemplating a professional career often will retain a
financial advisor rather than an agent, to avoid violating NCAA
amateurism rules. 
138
Another alternative is for an athlete to retain "the appropriate mix
of professionals [including] an attorney to negotiate the player
contract, an accountant to handle finances, an investment firm to
handle investments, and one of the sports marketing firms to handle
endorsements." 139 With this competition in mind, larger sports
agencies offer alternative billing arrangements, including flat fees,
hourly rates, and capped hourly rates. 140 Niche "image-consulting"
firms have also cropped up, offering specialized "brand development"
services to athletes, including product endorsements, website design,
media relations, and reputation and crisis management. 141
Increasingly, athletes who are self-reliant enough to take responsibility
and monitor the moving parts can access a full range of services,
including support in contract negotiations, from a slate of
professionals who in the aggregate will cost substantially less than the
commission-based agent. 142
B. Players Association Contract-Negotiation Services
Meanwhile, the four major players associations have intensified
their efforts to support athletes who choose to represent themselves in
contract negotiations.1 43 Describing those efforts first requires some
explanation of the unique characteristics of sports player unions.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, unions are certified as the
"exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit for purposes
of collective bargaining." 1 44 This means that once a union is certified,
137 See Rothstein, supra note 4, at 20.
138 See Karcher, supra note 32, at 747.
139 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 34.
140 LISA PIKE MASTERALEXIS ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SPORT
MANAGEMENT 280-81 (5th ed. 2015).
141 See, e.g., KMM SPORTS, http://kmmsports.com/of-the-field/ (last visited May
15, 2016) (representing NFL's Corey Nelson, Demontre Hurst, and others);
ATHLETE BRAND MANAGEMENT, http://athletebrandmanagement.con/ (last visited
May 15, 2016) (representing NBA player Carmelo Anthony).
142 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 27-28 ("With professional help from a
lawyer, accountant or even an economist, a superstar might agree with an owner to
only 80 or 90 percent of what an agent could have gotten him, and wind up in no
worse position than if an agent did the deal.").
143 See Lock, supra note 26, at 321.
14 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a).
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it alone has authority to negotiate the terms and conditions of
employment for all members of the bargaining unit. The employer
may not bargain with anyone but the union-not with individual
employees and not with non-union agents of those employees. 
145
In sports, however, because of the variability of player talent and
market value, the players associations have waived their exclusive
right to negotiate salaries for individual players, beyond collectively-
bargained minimum salaries, benefits, and job protections. 146
Furthermore, to support players in individual contract negotiations,
unions in the four major leagues have bargained for systems that
include standardized player contracts and a framework for contract
negotiations including revenue-sharing mechanisms that guarantee the
players collectively receive a minimum share of league revenues.
147
As noted above, the more rigid this framework, the more
straightforward the individual salary negotiation. 
148
In addition, players associations have bargained for the right of
their members to use a non-union representative-that is, a sports
agent-in the contract negotiation process with leagues and teams.
1 49
These representatives, however, must submit to a union certification
process that can include meeting minimal education requirements,
attending seminars, and passing a written examination. 150 Once
certified, most players associations require agents to remit an annual
fee and adhere to a standard code of conduct that caps commissions
charged to players, as well as polices unethical behavior and conflicts
of interest. 151 Critical to the unions' authority to enforce these
145 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) ("to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employers and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment .... ); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2012)
(holding it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees"); 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012) (stating that
the representative selected by the majority of all the employees in such unit is "the
exclusive [representative] of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment").
146 See WEILER, supra note 11, at 108; see Lock, supra note 26, at 321.
147 Lock, supra note 26, at 322; see supra text accompanying notes 496-52.
148 See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also WEILER, supra note 11,
at 697.
149 See Davis, supra note 47, at 817.
150 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 136-37; Darren A. Heitner & Bryan Saul,
Jay Z Has 99 Problems, and Being a Sports Agent May Be One, 24 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 59, 67-69 (2013). Courts have upheld the players associations' authority to
regulate agents. See Collins v. Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n, 850 F. Supp. 1468 (D.
Colo. 1991), affd, 976 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1992).
151 Heitner & Saul, supra note 150, at 68; See generally NFLPA Regulations,
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standards is their right under labor laws to ban non-certified agents
from representing players on contract matters and prohibit teams from
negotiating with non-certified agents.
1 52
Beyond certifying and regulating agents, players associations have
historically taken a neutral stance on whether their members should,
on principle, rely on sports agents as contract advisors. 153 Their
central message to the players has been that the union, more than
sports agents, deserves credit for bringing riches to the players.1 54 To
the extent a negative message about the utility or value of agents can
be read into union efforts to regulate the field, that message is
countermanded by most players associations' unwillingness to expend
resources actually policing and adjudicating agent misconduct.1 55 The
NFLPA is an outlier and recognized leader in this regard. It is willing
to regularly revisit and amend its agent regulations to respond to
problems, investigate and sanction agent misconduct, and provide
public reports about those investigations. 
156
The NFLPA has also been proven a leader in serving its members
who self-negotiate, dating back to former executive director Gene
Upshaw, who negotiated his own contracts with the Oakland Raiders
as a player in the 1960s and 1970s.157 Upshaw made it a point during
his NFLPA tenure "to provide the tools for players to do [negotiate
supra note 2; NBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents (as amended Feb. 2016);
MLB Regulations Governing Player Agents (as amended effective Feb. 15, 2016).
152 See WEILER, supra note 11, at 741; see, e.g., NFLPA Regulations, supra note
2, Introduction.
153 But see SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 25 (noting that former NFLPA
executive director Ed Garvey advised against using an agent).
154 See Brandt, supra note 23.
155 See Davis, supra note 47, at 823 (suggesting that lack of enforcement is
partially attributable to reluctance of agents and players to testify against agents); see
Lock, supra note 26, at 347; see also CARFAGNA, supra note 53, at 15 (noting that
several particularly flagrant cases of agent misconduct have even led the injured
athletes to sue their unions for negligence, without success).
156 See Davis, supra note 47, at 824; see also Shropshire, supra note 10, at 137-
40.
157 See Bove, supra note 9. NFLPA contract assistance is equally available to
agents to ensure the player is getting fair market value. Other union measures to
protect its members in player contract negotiations include: (1) a 2014 policy
statement that agents must arrange for players to consult with PA attorneys before
hiring outside counsel to represent them in appeal hearings or grievances that the PA
would handle for free; and (2) a 2016 regulation that actually requires agents to
consult with the union before finalizing certain veteran contracts. See NFLPA
Memorandum to Contract Advisors "Official Stated Policies of the NFLPA" at 3
(June 9, 2014); Mike Florio, New NFLPA Regulation Mandates Consultation During
Negotiations, NBC SPORTS (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2016/02/23/new-nflpa-regulation-mandates-
consultation-during-negotiations/ (last visited May 15, 2016).
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their own contracts]," including free advice, contract review, and
statistical comparisons. 158 That tradition has carried through to
Russell Okung's announcement of his intention to negotiate his own
contract upon becoming a free agent.1 59 Within a week, the NFLPA
supplied Okung with the top ten offensive tackle contracts and offered
further analysis and legal advice on contract language.1 60 Soon after,
the NFLPA convened a committee "to re-examine agent fees, educate
incoming rookies on options and look into creating an in-house
resource to negotiate contracts and/or advise players on doing their
own deals."1 61 While the NFLPA committee decided not to lower the
three percent maximum agent fee, it announced a new default fee of
1.5 percent and launched a campaign to educate players on their
freedom to negotiate alternative arrangements with agents, including
reduced and hourly fees. 1 62 In this regard, the "Compensation for
Services" provision of the NFLPA's Standard Representation
Agreement for agents has long listed a range of possible commissions
in half-percent increments, from one percent to three percent. 163
Other players associations also actively support self-negotiators,
building on services already offered to all players and their agents.
The National Hockey League Players Association (NHLPA) has an
archive of all player contracts and freely provides contract data to
players and their agents to assist in negotiations and salary
arbitrations. 164 The NBPA boasts that it "help[s] players all the time,
particularly when a player is without representation."1 65 The union's
website specifically notes that players can call on the union to "receive
158 See RUXIN, supra note 36, at 24.
159 See Pelissero, supra note 7.
160 d.
161 Id.
162 See Simon Chester, NFLPA decides not to reduce agent fees at annual
meeting, DRAFTWIRE http://draftwire.usatoday.con2016/03/20/nflpa-decides-not-to-
reduce-agent-fees-at-annual-meeting/ (last visited May 15, 2016). The NFLPA has
been forward-thinking on other fronts, including launching its own media company
to generate original content featuring its members as well as athletes from other
sports. See Michelle Castillo, NFLPA 's new media company gives access to
athletes, CNBC (Sep. 21, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/21/nflpas-new-
media-company-gives-access-to-athletes.html (last visited May 15, 2016); Tyler
Endebrock, NFLPA Lowers Default Agent Fee to 1.5 Percent, SPORTS AGENT BLOG
http://sportsagentblog.com/2016/08/10/nflpa-lowers-default-agent-fee-to- 1-5-
percent/?utm source=feedburner&utm medium=email&utm campaign=Feed%3 A+
IWantToBeASportsAgent+%28SportsAgentBlog.com+-+Sports+Agent+News %29
(last visited Aug. 11, 2016).
163 NFLPA Regulations, supra note 2, Appendix D.
16 See Stephen J. Bartlett, Contract Negotiations and Salary Arbitration in the
NHL... an Agent's View, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 2 (1993).
165 See RUXIN, supra note 36, at 25.
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salary and pertinent information to assist in individual contract
negotiations."1 66 As mentioned above, a top 2016 draft prospect took
the union up on that offer, announcing he would forgo an agent for his
rookie contract in favor of using the union.1 67 NBA veteran, Stephon
Marbury used the players association to negotiate his contracts toward
the end of his career, commenting "[t]he best thing about the NBPA is
that they work for you for free" and offer "strength in numbers,"
having negotiated the CBA for all the players. 
168
Nevertheless, the question remains: what more can and should the
player unions do to support players in contract negotiations? Some
commentators suggest that unions take back contract negotiations with
clubs on behalf of their members.1 69 Rather than pay agents three to
ten percent, players could pay slightly increased dues to their union to
fund increased staffing and resources to support and/or represent
players in contract negotiations.
1 7 0
Richard Karcher from Sports-Law Blog proposed a more radical
approach that he calls the "internal player management agency." 171
Under this system, player unions would "preserve the unique
bifurcation framework of collective and individual negotiations on
behalf of the players," but "offer[] players the option of retaining a
union-hired agent to represent them in contract negotiations with the
clubs."17 2 Karcher notes the potential advantages of salaried union
employees negotiating player contracts beyond the obvious savings in
agent fees, including: improved monitoring of agent competence;
ensuring all players earn fair market value and are not adversely
affected by one player's poor representation; coordinating
representation of each player across all settings, including grievances
and disciplinary matters already handled by the union; vitiating the
unethical practices that often accompany the fierce competition among
agents to secure and retain clients; and reducing conflicts of interest
that arise when an agent represents multiple players.1 7 3 As conceived
by Karcher, this system would not replace third-party agents, but
166 NBPA, http://nbpa.coniabout/ (last visited May 15, 2016).
167 See Wojnarowski & Marks, supra note 108.
168 See Michael McCann, Stephon Marbury uses Players 'Association to
represent him as a Free Agent, SPORTS LAW BLOG (July 4, 2009), http://sports-
law.blogspot.com/2009/07/stephon-marbury-uses-players.html (last visited June 21,
2016).
169 See Jones, supra note 132.
170 Id.
171 See Karcher, supra note 32, at 775.
172 Id. at 774-75.
173 Id. at 775-78.
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simply offer players another option. 174
Taking contract negotiations in-house, however, might raise as
many issues as it would resolve. First, player unions' long-term goals
may well be in conflict with an individual player's short-term needs,
especially given the brief career spans of so many professional
athletes.17 5 Second, a union-hired contract representative would not be
available to athletes at the moment they need counsel most-when
they are making the decision whether to turn pro and preparing for the
draft. 176 Third, some might consider it a drawback that union
representatives would not protect and "babysit" athletes the way sports
agents do, 177 although Karcher sees that as a feature that would
encourage more players to take personal responsibility for their lives
and careers.1 7 8 Meanwhile, no player union has taken any steps to
develop an internal player management agency, perhaps because the
trends mapped in this article have not reached the critical threshold to
support that structure.
IV. ETHICAL CONCERNS FOR THE LAWYERS DEALING WITH
A SELF-REPRESENTED ATHLETE
While the player side of the bargaining table wrestles with how
best to support the self-negotiator, pro sports' team counsel need to
appreciate the ethical challenges posed by negotiating directly with a
player. When a lawyer deals directly with a non-lawyer in a
transactional matter, the lawyer risks traversing three ethical
minefields: (A) assisting the non-lawyer's unauthorized practice of
law; (B) providing legal advice to an adverse unrepresented person;
and (C) communicating directly with a person receiving limited-scope
legal services on a subject within the scope of those services. 1 79 These
174 Id.
175 See Alejandro Bodipo-Memba, Life after the NFL: Typically a Struggle,
USA TODAY (Jan. 28, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/super/2006-
01-28-retirement-perils-x.htm.
176 See Glenn M. Wong et. al., Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to
Student-Athletes in A Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CARDOZO
ARTS &ENT. L.J. 553, 571 (2011).
177 See Carfagna, supra note 53, at v-vi (noting that most young athletes "lack
experience and training in anything outside their respective sports" and therefore
need someone "to guide them through what is usually newfound wealth, fame, and
opportunity").
178 See Richard Karcher, Players Unions Need to Fix the Agent Business,
SPORTS L. BLOG (Feb. 2, 2006), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/02/players-
unions-need-to-fix-agent_02.html; See also Rothstein, supra note 4, at 43.
179 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.2-4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983)
(hereinafter MODEL RULES); see, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.2, 4.3
(2012).
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challenges loom for team attorneys specifically, but not the non-
attorney members of the team's front office, and thus may be avoided
if teams do not use counsel to negotiate player contracts.1 80 However,
many teams do use lawyers-in-house and outside counsel-to
negotiate player contracts.18 1 Thus, this part addresses each of the
three ethical minefields in turn.
A. Assisting in the Unauthorized Practice of Law
The first minefield poses the risk that team attorneys are assisting
in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) when they negotiate directly
with non-lawyers, whether players, their family members and friends,
or non-attorney sports agents. 18 2 This concern is the easiest to resolve
as UPL rules do not apply to a party proceeding pro se (like the self-
negotiating player).'83 In addition, team counsel have negotiated with
non-attorney player representatives for decades without being cited for
facilitating UPL, although it has been suggested that non-attorney
sports agents themselves are violating UPL prohibitions. 18 4
Rather, the rules against facilitating UPL are intended to address
situations when a lawyer has a business relationship with a non-lawyer
and takes some affirmative action that enables the non-lawyer to
practice law.1 85 A New York bar ethics opinion directly addresses the
180 See infra text accompanying notes 228-233.
181 See Erik Spanberg, Teams Find Safety in Numbers When It Comes to Their
Legal Staff, SPORTS Bus. J. (May 11, 2015),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/05/1 1/In-Depth/Team-
counsel.aspx.
182 MODEL RULES, r. 5.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in
violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist
another in doing so."). This discussion assumes that the player is not himself an
attorney.; But see Joe Frontieria & Dan Leidl., WIVU's Oliver Luck: from West
Virginia and Back Again, WASH. POST (June 1, 2011) (noting that former NFL
quarterback Luck attained a law degree while playing for the Houston Oilers).
183 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. d
(2001).
184 See Caudill, supra note 29, at 701-04; see Geisel, supra note 131, at 241;
Megan Fuller, Where's the Penalty Flag? The Unauthorized Practice of Law, the
NCAA, and Athletic Compliance Directors, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 495, 496 (2010)
(arguing that college athletic compliance directors are violating state UPL statutes).
185 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR. ASS'N, 8th ed.
2015) [hereinafter "Annotated Model Rules"] (listing cases); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. f (2001); Compare N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS'N COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS, Formal Op. 809 (2007) (no UPL assistance being
provided when lawyer represents a client in a transaction in which the counterparty
has chosen to be represented by a non-lawyer), with ARIZ. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM.
ON RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Formal Op. 99-107 (finding a UPL violation when
continued...
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situation in which a lawyer representing a client in a transactional
matter faces off against a non-lawyer.1 86 Even if the lawyer suspects
that the non-lawyer is engaged in UPL, the lawyer is under no duty to
inquire further.1 87 As long as the lawyer has not enabled the non-
lawyer to undertake this role, she does not assist UPL by merely
continuing with a transaction intended to serve the lawyer's client. 
18 8
This interpretation of UPL rules should equally apply to insulate team
counsel from ethical risk when dealing with non-attorney player
representatives. 
1 89
B. Dealing with an Unrepresented Person
Potentially more fraught is the second ethical minefield when
dealing directly with a self-negotiating player: impermissibly
providing legal advice to an adverse unrepresented person. Under
Model Rule 4.3, a lawyer dealing with an unrepresented person must
take care not to: (1) "state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested,"
(2) lead the unrepresented person to "misunderstand[] the lawyer's
role in the matter," or (3) "give legal advice to the unrepresented
person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have
a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the
client."190 The rationale behind this rule is that a lawyer may be in a
superior negotiating position when dealing with an unrepresented
person, who is entitled to legal protections against overreaching by the
lawyer. 191
Most commentary on Rule 4.3 focuses on the litigation context,
but it is equally applicable in the transactional setting. 192 While a
a lawyer negotiates with an opposing party's non-lawyer public adjuster).
186 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS, supra note 185.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Contrast a 1999 Arizona formal ethics opinion that defined UPL to include
negotiating a contract, and then barred lawyers from setting claims with non-attorney
insurance adjusters; ARIZ. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT,
supra note 186. (The New York bar committee specifically noted its disagreement
with the Arizona opinion as perversely empowering a non-represented counterparty
to deny the right to counsel to a represented party.).
19 Annotated Model Rules, supra note 185, r. 4.3.
191 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 cmt. b
(2001).
192 Annotated Model Rules, supra note 185, r. 4.3 cmt. 2; see, e.g., N.Y.C. BAR
ASS'N, COMM. ON PROF'L AND JUD. ETHICS, Formal Op. 2009-2, at 4 (2009)
(acknowledging application of New York version of rule in transactional setting);
Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers'
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lawyer may negotiate the terms of a transaction with an unrepresented
counterparty, the lawyer must explain that she represents only her
client and is not representing the counterparty.193 The greatest ethical
risk faced by a lawyer in this situation may well be the impermissible
rendering of legal advice to the unrepresented counterparty. 194 Russell
Engler has identified four behavioral "clues" from case law for
lawyers confronting this risk:
First, drafting legal documents and presenting them for
signature, without more, does not amount to advice.
Second, a statement of the action the lawyer's client
proposes to take does not amount to impermissible
"advice." Third, a statement advising an unrepresented
person to obtain independent counsel is not only
permissible, but may become mandatory once
communication is inevitable. Fourth, statements
necessary to clarify that the lawyer is not disinterested,
or to correct a misunderstanding as to whether the
lawyer is disinterested, are permissible and may also be
mandatory. 195
Two separate New York bar ethics committees have elaborated on
what kind of statements a lawyer may make to a self-represented
person in the context of a negotiation.1 96 They agree that a lawyer
may describe her client's own legal position, as long as her status as
interested counsel is obvious. 197 She may go further to provide
"certain indisputable information to the unrepresented person, such as
the filing requirements" relevant to the legal setting in which the
Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 81 (1997)
(noting that little attention has been given to the ethics of negotiating with an
unrepresented person).
193 Annotated Model Rules, supra note 185, r. 4.3 cmt. 2. (This obligation
applies equally to in-house lawyers who wear both "business" and "legal" hats.) Lisa
A. Dolak, Negotiation Ethics: Not an Oxymoron, INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL., r.16.7.8,
at 17 (Fall 2003).
194 See Annotated Model Rules, supra note 185 (listing cases); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 cmt. d (2001); see also Engler,
supra note 192, at 82 (noting the frequency of negotiations between lawyers and lay
people and the corresponding frequency of impermissible advice-giving).
195 Id at 94 (footnotes omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §) 103 Reporter's Note (2001) (observing that state law can
vary on all of these situations).
196 N.Y. BAR ASS'N, COMM. ON PROF'L AND JUD. ETHICS, supra note 185; N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Formal Op. 768 (2003).
197 Id.
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negotiation is taking place.1 98 Throughout the interaction, however,
the lawyer has a continuing duty to avoid misleading the self-
represented person and even to take affirmative steps to clarify her
role as adverse to that person.199 Avoiding giving legal advice gets
more complicated when the lawyer prepares a document for signature
by the unrepresented person, as team counsel might do with respect to
a standard player contract.2 0 0 In the transactional setting, a lawyer
may prepare a document that accommodates the needs of the lawyer's
client and present it to the unrepresented person, as long as the lawyer
does not undertake to advise the unrepresented person concerning the
meaning or significance of the document.
2 0 1
With these "clues" in mind, team counsel must carefully walk the
lines drawn by Rule 4.3 when dealing directly with a player, as
opposed to a non-attorney agent or lawyer. Even those players with
the maturity and self-confidence to represent themselves are often
relatively young and legally unsophisticated. 0 2 Thus, team counsel
should explicitly identify their role in negotiations, explaining to the
player that they represent the team and will be protecting the team's
interests. 203 They should refrain both from opining about the law
(including the private law embodied in the CBA) and from
recommending to players a particular course of conduct.2 0 4 Further,
they should avoid making editorial comments about contracts and
198 Id.
199 N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N, COMM. ON PROF'L AND JUD. ETHICS, supra note 192.
200 Id.
201 See N.C. STATE BAR, 2015 Formal Ethics Op. 2 (2015) (permitting lawyer to
prepare waiver of right to notice of foreclosure for unrepresented borrower);
PHILADELPHIA BAR ASS'N PROF'L GUIDANCE COMM., Op. 2011-4 (2011) (estate
settlement agreement); S.C. BAR ETHICS ADVISORY COMM., Ethics Advisory Op. 00-
17 (2000) (real estate closing documents). This issue frequently arises in the context
of the prenuptial agreement, whose validity can depend on whether one party lacks
independent counsel, and whether that party was given an opportunity to seek
counsel and knowingly refused it. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815,
828 (2000); see also Nancy R. Schembri, Prenuptial Agreements and the
Significance of Independent Counsel, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 313, 344-
45 (2003).
202 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 cmt. b
(2001) ("A lawyer dealing with a sophisticated business person will have less need
for caution than when dealing with an unsophisticated nonclient."); see Karcher,
supra note 32, at 752.
203 See N.C. 2004 Formal Ethics Op. No. 10 (2004) (buyer's lawyer in real
estate closing may prepare deed for unrepresented seller as long as she explains to
seller that she does not represent him and that in absence of contract specifications,
lawyer will prepare deed that protects her client's interests).
204 Engler, supra note 192, at 97.
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other documents they prepare for the self-negotiating player to sign.
20 5
Nor may team counsel circumvent this prohibition by coaching other
front office personnel to give advice to the player about the contract
negotiation. 20 6 The risks for team counsel in this situation go beyond
sanctions for unethical conduct and could include liability for a
player's detrimental reliance on team counsel's statements. 20 7
C. Communicating with a Person Receiving Limited-Scope
Legal Services
As for the third ethical minefield-communicating with a person
receiving limited-scope legal services-team counsel are increasingly
likely to encounter this risk as players combine self-negotiation with
retention of hourly-rate attorneys for the purpose of delimited contract
advice and review. 208 This type of "limited-scope representation,"
countenanced by Model Rule 1.2(c), 20 9 may be invisible to team
counsel because the player's attorney is operating behind the scenes or
entered the picture only after contract negotiations are under way.
Under these circumstances, team counsel may unwittingly violate
Model Rule 4.2, known as the "no-contact" rule. 210 This rule prohibits
a lawyer from communicating with an adverse party whom "the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless
the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer." 211 On its face, the ban
on contact only applies when a lawyer "knows" that the player is
represented by counsel, but such knowledge "may be inferred from the
circumstances." 212 Thus, team counsel negotiating directly with a
player runs the risk of violating Rule 4.2 if the player turns out to have
a limited-scope lawyer in the background, advising on the contract
negotiations.
2 13
The American Bar Association ethics committee in 2015 issued a
formal opinion in an attempt to clarify a lawyer's obligations in this
205 Id. at 87.
206 See MODEL RULES, r. 8.4(a) (defining attorney misconduct as including using
"another" to violate Rules).
207 See generally Michael K. Abernathy, Client or Adverse Party-Who Shall an
Attorney Represent?: Duties Toward an Unrepresented Party in Transactions, 19 J.
LEGAL PROF. 337, 338-42 (1994) (unrepresented party may recover damages against
an adverse attorney who engages in fraud or intentional deceit).
201 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
209 MODEL RULES, r. 1.2(c).
210 See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 472
(2015).
211 MODEL RULES, r. 4.2.
212 Id. at 4.2, cmt. 8.
213 ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 472 (2015).
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setting.214 Namely, the opinion addressed what a lawyer should do if
she believes a self-represented person, adverse to her client, is
receiving some assistance from a lawyer. May the suspecting lawyer
continue to communicate directly with the person, or must she go
through the person's lawyer? The committee acknowledged the
"quandary" faced by a lawyer who believes she is dealing with a self-
represented person, as the situation does not precisely align with either
Rule 4.2's no-contact rule for parties who retain full-scope
representation or Rule 4.3's defined-contact rule for the truly pro se
party. 215 Therefore, the committee recommended that when a lawyer
reasonably suspects the ostensibly self-represented person has
received some degree of legal assistance in a matter, the lawyer has a
duty to inquire whether that person has retained counsel.21 6 In the
transactional setting, suspicions may be triggered by documents that
appear to be ghostwritten, such as "an agreement or a counteroffer that
appears to have been prepared by a lawyer."
217
The committee recommended that a suspecting lawyer's
inquiry proceed in three steps. First, the lawyer should ask whether
the person is represented by counsel for any portion of the matter, to
determine whether to proceed under Rule 4.2 or 4.3.218 If the person
disclaims retaining counsel or discloses limited-scope representation
and states that either it has concluded or it did not encompass the
matter at hand, the lawyer may continue to communicate directly with
the self-represented person. 21 9 For example, if the person responds
that a limited-scope lawyer drafted a document, but is not providing
any other representation, the inquiring lawyer is permitted to deal
directly with the person under Rule 4.2 and must comport with the
requirements of Rule 4.3.22o
Second, if the person's response does not clearly insulate the
inquiring lawyer from Rule 4.2 risk, the lawyer should reach out to
opposing counsel to understand the scope of the representation and to
determine the issues, if any, on which she may communicate directly
with the person.221 Assuming some degree of direct communication is
permitted, the lawyer nonetheless must remain vigilant about the risk
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 472 (2015).
at 8.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1.
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of violating the "no-contact" rule. 222 At any point in the ongoing
matter, if the lawyer suspects that the person has revived or expanded
the limited-scope representation, the lawyer should take step three-
once again inquiring about the involvement of counsel. 223
Unfortunately, this ABA guidance places all the burden on the
suspecting lawyer to inquire and take care.
224
For team counsel dealing with a self-negotiating player, the ABA's
interpretation of the "no-contact" rule recommends having an explicit
conversation about what, if any, behind-the-scenes legal assistance is
being provided to the player. 225 If team counsel learn at any point
during the contract negotiation that the player has enlisted a lawyer's
help, counsel should postpone further conversation with the player
about the contract until clarifying with the player's lawyer exactly
what may be communicated directly with the player. 226 Furthermore,
a player's limited-scope lawyer would serve her client and the
negotiation process well by flagging these issues for the player and, at
an appropriate time, reaching out to team counsel to affirmatively
delineate the areas of permitted direct communication with the
player. 227
As suggested above, team counsel may attempt to avoid these
ethical quandaries by nominating non-attorney front office personnel
for the role of negotiating directly with a self-represented player.
228
However, even in this situation, team counsel may run afoul of the no-
contact rule. 229 It is true that Rule 4.2 does not restrict parties-such
as the team's general manager and the player-from communicating
with each other directly, even if they each have their own lawyers.
230
Furthermore, the ABA ethics committee has opined that the lawyers in
this situation may advise their clients regarding the content of
communications with each other, and may even draft "basic"
documents for those communications. 231  However, those lawyers
222 Id. at 5-6.
223 Id. at 6-7.
224 ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 472 (2015)
at 6.
225 See id. at 8.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 3.
228 See supra notes 180 and 206 and accompanying text.
229 See ILL. ETHICS OP. 04-02 (2005) (general counsel may not cause another
corporate employee to communicate with a potential new hire directly while general
counsel is negotiating employment contract with new hire's lawyer).
230 See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 461
(2011) (noting that parties in a transactional matter "have the right to communicate
directly with each other").
231 Id. at 4.
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must be careful not to "script the communication" or otherwise
attempt to do, indirectly, what they are not permitted to do directly.
232
More precisely, the ABA ethics committee advises against a lawyer
assisting her client "in securing from the represented person an
enforceable obligation, disclosure of confidential information, or
admissions against interest without the opportunity to seek the advice
of counsel. 233
This guidance gives team counsel latitude to help prepare the
general manager (or other front office personnel) to negotiate with the
player, including reviewing documents for use in that negotiation.
But, team counsel may not coach the general manager to induce the
player to enter a contract without first consulting with his own
counsel.234 Again, faced with this slippery standard and an athlete
who has retained a lawyer in connection with his player contract, team
counsel may want to comport their conduct with Rule 4.2, even if they
are not leading the negotiations with the player.
In sum, when an athlete represents himself or uses limited-scope
legal services in a contract negotiation, lawyers on the other side of the
table must be alert for potential ethical issues to avoid serious
consequences for both counsel and clients.
235
V. RECONCEIVING THE VALUE OF SPORTS AGENTS
As more players choose to represent themselves in contract
negotiations, or otherwise opt out of the traditional athlete-agent
relationship, the sports agent business is headed for a crisis of
confidence. Arguably, that crisis has already arrived with the
widespread concern about agent competence, conflicts, and conduct.
236
It takes on new urgency, however, as athletes are questioning the very
232 See Annotated Model Rules, supra note 185 (listing cases); see ABA COMM.
ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 461 (2011); MODEL RULES, r.
8.4(a) (lawyer may not induce another to violate the ethical rules on his behalf).
233 See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 461
(2011).
234 Id. at 5.
235 Disciplinary authorities have full power to act in response as they deem
warranted by the nature and extent of the violation, and routinely suspend and fine
lawyers for violations of, for example, the no-contact rule. See, e.g., In re
Disciplinary Action Against Lucas, 789 N.W.2d 73, 78 (N.D. 2010) (per curiam)
(affirming 30-day suspension and fine against attorney who communicated directly
with other party's board of directors).
236 See Karcher, supra note 32, at 739 ("[E]veryone, including players, heads of
the players associations, and even many agents, universally agrees that such behavior
is a problem."); see Note, Harvard or Hardball? An Examination of Ethical Issues
Faced by Lawyer-Agents, 21 SPORTS LAW. J. 45, 54 (2014) (noting "wide ranging
and well-documented history of 'agent abuse"').
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value proposition of using an agent in the setting of the player contract
negotiation. As one commentator put it: "to bring down the pro sports
agent house of cards, players need only to sincerely question 'what are
we getting for the percentage of gross compensation that we pay to our
agents?"' 237 In the current environment of rookie pay scales, veteran
maximums, and league-wide salary caps, the answer may well be to
forgo a commission-based agent in favor of i la carte advice at an
hourly rate.
Players will undoubtedly continue to rely on third parties,
including sports agents, for a wide variety of services such as
marketing and branding, investment advice and financial management,
and tax and estate planning. But the core service offered by sports
agents has always been the player contract negotiation. 23' To be fair,
professional advice in this setting "usually pays off for major league
athletes..., provided the advice comes from a competent, honest
person." 239 The question is how can sports agents make that advice
pay off for both athletes and themselves in today's sports economy?
Further, how can athletes regain confidence in the integrity of their
representatives?
Traditional sports agents need new strategies to deliver value in
contract negotiations, rather than simply try to shore up existing
business structures. 240  As the utility of middlemen shrinks in the
information age, agents need to innovate to position themselves as
more than "parasites." 241 "Showing the money" alone is not enough in
an era when CBAs circumscribe compensation and player salaries, and
deal structures are widely disseminated on the Internet. Like other
middlemen faced with technology's disintermediation of their role,
agents must differentiate and specialize. 242 As lawyers have already
come to realize in other contexts, "clients who are not satisfied with
professional services will seek other providers," including representing
237 See Karcher, supra note 32, at 743.
231 See id. at 740.
239 See RUXIN, supra note 36, at 26.
241 See Mike Florio, Amid Talk of Players Not Using Agents, Rival Agents to
Meet, NBC SPORTS (July 23, 2015),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.conim2015/07/23/amid-talk-of-players-not-using-
agents-rival-agents-to-meet/ (describing agents' "aggressive effort" to resist NFLPA
regulation and encouragement of player self-negotiation).
241 See Evans, supra note 27, at 94.
242 Gary A. Munneke, Legal Skills for A Transforming Profession, 22 PACE L.
REV. 105, 111 (2001); see also Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, No Path but
One: Law School Survival in an Age of Disruptive Technology, 59 WAYNE L. REV.
193, 230-32 (2013) (observing that the illusion of "permanence" afflicts every
generation and profession, including travel agents, record stores, and newspapers).
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themselves pro se. 2 4 3
Instead, agents should focus on generating distinctive tangible and
intangible benefits for the athletes who rely on them to negotiate
player contracts, for example, the advantages that arise from using a
representative with a solid reputation and cooperative relationships
with teams, and expertise as a seasoned negotiator who is familiar with
CBA economics. 244 Agents also create value when serving as an
"insulator" for the player, buffering him from the candor and hard
bargaining that might damage his relationship with the team. 245
Agents should build on the widespread availability of data and the free
resources provided by players associations to offer analytics expertise
in contract negotiations. 246 Big data, investment in technology, and
specialized analytical tools have transformed other facets of the sports
industry, and could be equally applied to bolster player market values.
Player and game performance analytics should not be the sole
province of a team pursuing a winning record, but can also be
deployed by an agent pursuing a lucrative contract on behalf of his
client.
Most importantly, agents should experiment with alternative fee
arrangements, setting fees that better correspond to the value of the
services rendered and that are structured to avoid the conflicts of
interest inherent in negotiating a contract that includes payments to the
agent.247 For contracts that award an agent a percentage off the top,
agents should outsource the drafting and review process to an
independent hourly lawyer, beholden only to the player. 248 This
approach may shore up player confidence in agents by introducing
transparency and proportionality to the methods by which agents are
paid for their services. 249 Of course, these proposals largely skirt a
critical problem in the sports agent business-solicitation of amateur
243 See Munneke, supra note 242 at 113.
244 See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 23-24; Mike Florio, Good Agents Do a
Lot More Than Negotiate Contracts, NBC SPORTS (July 23, 2015),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/07/23/good-agents-do-a-lot-more-than-
negotiate-contracts/; Heitner, supra note 69.
245 See generally MARINA KRAKOVSKY, THE MIDDLEMAN ECONOMY: How
BROKERS, AGENTS, DEALERS, AND EVERYDAY MATCHMAKERS CREATE VALUE AND
PROFIT 173-74 (2015) (describing agent Drew Rosenhaus as an insulator who
protects players' relationships with their teams); CARFAGNA, supra note 53, at 80-
81.
246 See Evans, supra note 27, at 98-99.
247 See id.
248 Any such arrangement would be subject to ethical rules regarding the
professional independence of a lawyer and prohibitions on fee-sharing with
nonlawyers. See MODEL RULES, r. 5.4.
249 See Caudill, supra note 29, at 710.
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athletes at risk of their NCAA eligibility. 250 The problems associated
with overly aggressive recruitment of college athletes are beyond the
scope of this article. However, many of those problems stem from an
agent compensation system that incentivizes coercive tactics, improper
inducements, and self-interest seeking. 251 Fixing this compensation
system may realign the incentives and promote ethical representation
where numerous efforts at regulation have thus far failed.252
Finally, agents should consider reforming their "babysitting" role
to offer standardized "concierge" services that draw ethical lines and
do not infantilize the athlete, while enabling him to focus on
practicing, training, and competing in his sport. 253 Agents have
already made headway in this area in terms of the services they offer
to the pre-draft athlete, including preparing for workouts, mediating
information about particular teams and their needs, and dealing with
the media. 254  Some agencies already plug itemized categories of
concierge services, including travel assistance, entertainment planning,
and personal shopping. 255 Flexibility and transparency in their
relationships with players will go a long way to restoring confidence
in the sports agent business.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trends in professional athletes representing themselves in player
contract negotiations respond to and illuminate other developments in
the sports industry, including increasing prosperity, evolving CBA
frameworks, and concerns about sports agent ethics. While highly
individualistic, players' decisions to self-negotiate reveal recurring
scenarios: the player with predictable market value; the rookie subject
to a pay scale; and the free agent who wants to stay in place as he
returns from injury, winds down his career, believes he can factor into
a winning season, or simply feels loyalty to a team that has treated him
well. Whether or not the paradigm of the sports-agent-led negotiation
is shifting, increasing player self-negotiation is a harbinger of the need
for some self-correction in the sports agent business. Meanwhile,
other service providers, including hourly-rate lawyers, ancillary
professions and firms, and the players' own unions, are viewing the
situation opportunistically and experimenting with new service
250 See Karcher, supra note 32, at 762.
251 See id. at 750.
252 See SPARTA, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
253 See KRAKOVSKY, supra note 245, at 146; supra text accompanying note 130.
254 See Wong, supra note 176, at 571; Geisel, supra note 131, at 228.
255 See, e.g., LMM SPORTS MANAGEMENT LLC,
http://www.lmmsports.com/services/concierge-services/ (last visited May 15, 2016).
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models. Athletes navigating this new terrain should seek a service
model that is cost-effective and reinforces their authority as principal
in the agency relationship.
At the same time, leagues, teams, and their lawyers who find
themselves negotiating with self-represented athletes must tread
carefully to avoid ethical minefields and preserve goodwill with their
most important asset-the players who populate their sport.
Ambiguity about whether the self-negotiating player has retained any
legal services poses the biggest ethical risk to team counsel: violating
the no-contact rule. Also present is the risk of providing
impermissible legal advice to the truly lawyer-less player, especially if
that player does not grasp that the team's lawyer is not disinterested.
Team counsel should be explicit in describing their role to self-
negotiating players, and vigilant about the background presence of an
attorney, to avoid pro se remorse and accusations of unconscionability
and ethical breach.
At best, this article will encourage sports agents to use the
conversation about athlete self-negotiation to reinvent their role in a
direction that not only creates value for players, but also incentivizes
good behavior across the business.
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